Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Faculty Scholarship

Winter 2018

Sequencing Peace and Justice in Syria
Milena Sterio
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, m.sterio@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Repository Citation
Sterio, Milena, "Sequencing Peace and Justice in Syria" (2018). Law Faculty Articles and Essays. 984.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/984

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu.

SEQUENCING PEACE AND JUSTICE IN SYRIA
Milena Sterio •
345
346
III. EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE MODELS ..................................... 349
IV. HIM ............................................................................................................. 356
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 358
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................

II.

DUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND JUSTICE ..........................................................

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has caused the death of hundreds of
thousands of individuals and the displacement of millions. 1 Efforts to refer
the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) have
consistently failed despite well-documented reports about the commission
of serious crimes in Syria, including the use of chemical weapons against
civilians, torture, the use of child soldiers, and crimes of sexual violence. 2
Only a handful of situations have been investigated thus far, mostly within
national jurisdictions of western European nations. 3 While the Security
Council has been deadlocked with respect to Syria, the General Assembly
passed a resolution in December 2016, establishing the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under
International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March
2011 (Mechanism or IDM). 4 As of today, it is unclear whether the evidence
gathered through the Mechanism will be used in a subsequent prosecution,
and whether the work of the Mechanism will lead toward accountability for
those responsible for Syrian atrocities .

•

Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law. The author would like to thank the organizers of International Law Weekend 2017 for
the opportunity to present these remarks and discuss other arguments from this Article.

I.
Jack Moore, Syria War Death Toll Hits 321,000 with Further 145,000 Missing: Monitor,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2017, 1:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sixth-anniversary-syrian-conflict-loo
ms-war-monitor-says-465000-killed-0r-567181 (reporting that as of March 2017, the war in Syria has
resulted in 321,000 deaths and that an additional 145,000 individuals were missing).
2.
Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails As
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Press Release
SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
3.

See infra Part II.

4.
Beti Hohler & Elizabeth Pederson, The Syria Mechanism: Bridge to Prosecutions Or
Evidentiary Limbo?, E-INT'L REL. (May 26, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/26/the-syria-mechanis
m-bridge-t<>-prosecutions-0r-evidentiary-limbo/.
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Parallel to the ongoing quest for accountability, the international
community has been concerned with negotiating peace for Syria in order to
end the violent civil war, which has already claimed thousands of lives. 5
Achieving peace in Syria may not necessarily lead toward immediate
accountability, and conversely, a focus on accountability may derail the
peace process. This Article will explore whether the dual goals of peace
and justice can be reconciled in the Syrian context, and how these goals
may be properly sequenced, in order to potentially achieve long-lasting
peace in Syria without sacrificing justice. Part I will explore the tension
between the dual goals of peace and justice in both a theoretical manner, as
well as in the Syrian context. Part II will describe existing accountability
models in the international community and how these may be applicable in
the Syrian situation, and Part III will focus on the work of the Mechanism,
an already established model of preliminary accountability for Syria. This
Article will conclude that peace and justice may appear irreconcilable in
some contexts, but that such goals may co-exist if properly sequenced and
applied to a particular situation, such as Syria.
II.

DUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND JUSTICE

Peace and justice may co-exist in some contexts and societies. Peace
and justice may however appear irreconcilable in other transitional justice
scenarios. In some situations, the pursuit of justice and accountability may
be viewed as undermining the prospects of peace. In such transitional
justice societies, the pursuit of peace may appear more important than the
quest for accountability, and the latter may be sacrificed in order to halt
bloodshed and achieve peace. 6 In other situations, however, it may be
possible to sequence peace and justice--to seek the end of violence first but
to focus on accountability later.
In several Latin American countries, dictators which had ruled such
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s peacefully stepped out of power,
but requested blanket amnesties for themselves and other members of their
oppressive regimes. 7 In such instances, it may be argued that accountability

5.
News Focus: Syria, UN NEWS CTR., https://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infoc
usID=l46 (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (reporting on ongoing Syrian peace negotiations, and that parties
to the peace process have met in Geneva four times during 2017, and three times during 2016; reporting
also that parties to the peace process attended, in parallel, Astana peace talks in Kazakhstan in early
2017).
6.
See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY
Tow ARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 1---6 (Elin Skaar et al. eds., 2016).

7.

Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87

GEO. L.J. 707, 720-29 (1999); see Jo-Marie Burt, The Torture Report: Latin America's lessons for the
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was sacrificed toward the pursuit of peace and a peaceful transition to
democracy. In many Latin American countries, however, accountability
has become important and amnesty laws have been overturned or ignored.
Thus, criminal trials have moved forward in several countries, including
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Guatemala. 8 It may be argued that
while the pursuit of peace and the goal of a peaceful transition to
democracy trumped accountability in the first instance in many Latin
American societies, but that accountability remained important nonetheless
and is currently at the forefront in many such countries and societies.
In other instances, peace and justice have always co-existed, either
through peace accords coupled with modified accountability mechanisms,
or through peace accords and concurrent prosecutions. South Africa is an
example of the former. When the South African apartheid regime
negotiated its surrender of power and agreed to transition to a democratic
regime, questions of accountability prominently surfaced. 9
Would
members of the apartheid regime face accountability for the atrocities
which they committed while in power? If so, pursuant to which model of
accountability? Accountability became a stumbling stone in the transition
process, with the ruling apartheid party members requiring immunity from
prosecution as a condition of their peaceful exit from power. 10 A solution
was negotiated with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC}-a commission equipped with issuing amnesty (from
domestic prosecution) to those who testified before it and were able to
establish that the acts which they committed had a political purpose. 11
Ultimately, the TRC granted 1167 applications for amnesty, out of a total of
7000 applications received; those who did not receive amnesty from the
TRC remained subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution in South
African courts. 12 In South Africa, the goal of peace resulted in the creation
United States, NACLA (Dec. 10, 2014), https://naclaorg/news/2014/12/l 0/torture-report-latin-america' s
lessons-united-states.
8.

Burt, supra note 7.

9.
Jasmina Brankovic, Responsabilidad y Reconciliaci6n Naciona/ en Sudlifrica
[Accountability and National Reconciliation in South Africa], EDICIONES INFOJus: DERECHOS
HUMANOS 2, no. 4, 2013, at 55-86.
10.
Unit 6. The End of Apartheid and the Birth of Democracy, S. AFR.: OVERCOMING
APARTHEID BUILDING DEMOCRACY, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2018); Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in
TRUTH v. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141, 143--44 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
Thompson eds., 2000).
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/ (last visited
11.
Feb. 4, 2018).

TRC Category - 3. Amnesty, TRACES TRUTH, http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?
12.
cat=3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
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of a modified accountability mechanism, the TRC. While many have
applauded the TRC as an appropriate mechanism for achieving peace and
reconciliation in South Africa, some have questioned whether such
commissions in general provide appropriate accountability for those
responsible of the most serious atrocities and violations of international
law.13 It may be concluded that in South Africa, peace and justice co
existed, but that justice took on a modified accountability form through the
TRC.
The former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone are examples of transitional
justice scenarios where peace and accountability co-existed almost
simultaneously. In the former Yugoslavia, the civil war ended with the
Dayton Peace Accords of 1995; the accords did not include an immunity
clause for any Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim leaders and their respective
regimes. 14 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY),
which was established through Security Council Chapter VII powers a few
years before the Dayton Peace Accords, was ultimately able to prosecute
most senior leaders of former Yugoslav states. 15 Thus, in the former
Yugoslavia, justice was not sacrificed for peace, and the pursuit of peace
did not derail the pursuit of accountability. Instead, peace and justice were
correctly sequenced and it may be argued that both were achieved.
In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lome Peace Accord contained an amnesty
provision. 16 When the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in
2002, the Court determined that it could impose accountability ofthose who
may have been subjects of the amnesty provision of the Lome Peace
Accord, because the amnesty concerned domestic prosecutions only and the
Court was of an international/hybrid character. 17 In Sierra Leone, like in

13.
See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) et al. v. President of the Republic of South Africa
1996 (4) SA I (CC) at 22 para 21 (S. Afr.).
14.

See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn.

& Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 l.L.M. 75; see also John R.W.D. Jones, The Implications of
the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EUR. J. INT'L

L. 226, 234 (1996) (noting that the Dayton Peace Accords did not contain an amnesty clause).
15.
The ICTY "was established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter as an enforcement measure aimed at restoring and maintaining international peace and
security in the region (S/RES/827 (1993))." Jones, supra note 14, at 226 n.2 (1996). For a general
discussion of the relationship between the Dayton Peace Accords and the ICTY, see id. at 226--44.
16.
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone, Sierra-Leona-R.U.F./S.L., July 7, 1999.
17.
Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber, May 25, 2004, SCSL-2004-14
AR72(E), (SL); Press Release, Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Special Court Rejects Amnesty for
the Worst Crimes Known to Humanity (Mar. 18, 2004) ("The Special Court for Sierra Leone held that,
in accordance with international law, the general amnesty granted in the 1999 Lome peace agreement
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the former Yugoslavia, peace and justice were properly sequenced and
somewhat simultaneously achieved.
The above examples demonstrate that peace and justice may co-exist,
and that, if sequenced properly, both may be achieved in a transitional
society. In Syria, the goal of peace should not altogether trump the goal of
accountability. Peace and accountability could co-exist, similar to the
South African, Yugoslav, and Sierra Leonian experiences. Peace and
justice could co-exist either pursuant to the South African model, where
accountability took the form of a TRC, or pursuant to the former
Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone models, where a peace treaty was signed and
accountability imposed, through an international or hybrid tribunal, in the
short term following the achievement of peace. The section below will
briefly discuss existing accountability options for Syria.
Ill.

EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE MODELS

Several accountability models exist and have already been utilized in
different international and non-international conflicts. Such accountability
models include national prosecutions, internationalized domestic war
crimes chambers, hybrid tribunals, international ad hoc tribunals, and the
ICC. 18 In addition, truth and reconciliation commissions, as mentioned
above, have been formed and analyzed as alternative models of
accountability. 19 This section will briefly describe such existing models of
accountability while assessing whether they could be utilized in the Syrian
context.
Perpetrators of atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, or other violations, can be prosecuted in national courts, provided
that such national jurisdictions have penal laws which have codified such
international crimes as well as appropriate jurisdictional statutes. 20 As of
today, many national jurisdictions have penal codes which embrace
international crimes. 21 In addition, perpetrators of international offenses
was 'ineffective' in preventing international courts, such as the Special Court, or foreign courts from
prosecuting crimes against humanity and war crimes.").
18.
See generally Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment of Their
Utility Post-ICC, 19 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237 (2013) (noting different types of models of

accountability and existing tribunals).
19.
Abdul Rahman Lamin, Building Peace Through Accountability in Sierra Leone: The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, 38 J. AsIAN & AFR. STUD. 295 (2003)

(discussing truth and reconciliation commissions and accountability).
20.
See, e.g., Helmut Kreicker, National Prosecution of International Crimes from A
Comparative Perspective, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 313 (2005).
21.

DAVID A. KAYE, COUNClL ON FOREIGN REL., COUNClL SPECIAL REP. No. 61, JUSTICE

BEYOND THE HAGUE:

SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN NATIONAL
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can often be charged and prosecuted for domestic law offenses, such as
murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, etc. 22 Most national jurisdictions require
a nexus between the perpetrator or investigated alleged crime and their own
territory. 23 Thus, many national courts will exercise jurisdiction over an
offender ifthe offender is a national of the prosecuting.state, if victims were
nationals of the prosecuting state, or if the national security interests of the
prosecuting state were somehow harmed by the underlying criminal
offense. 24 Some countries have codified the principle of universal
jurisdiction and allow for prosecutions of all alleged criminals for
particularly heinous offenses, such as genocide, torture, slavery, etc. 25
Perpetrators of atrocities in Syria could be prosecuted in Syrian
national courts for domestic/Syrian law offenses under Syrian criminal
law. 26 Syrian courts would surely have jurisdiction over Syrian perpetrators
for alleged crimes committed on Syrian territory. This scenario, although
theoretically possible, is not feasible in the current political climate and
leadership of President Assad. It is unlikely that President Assad would
allow Syrian courts to investigate atrocities which may potentially implicate
his own regime. In addition, because of the ongoing conflict in Syria, it is
uncertain how much capacity Syrian domestic courts would have to
undertake a complex investigation and prosecution, which could implicate a
multitude of evidentiary documents, witnesses, and other resources. 27
'
COURTS 6 (June 2011), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pd:fl201 l/05/Beyond_The_Hague_CSR
61.pdf (noting that countries such as Argentina, Bosnia, Colombia and Germany have established
national courts and specialized chambers capable of prosecuting individuals for war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and that many NATO countries have the practice of prosecuting their own military
personnel accused of war crimes).

See, e.g., Courts of First Resort: Prosecuting International Crimes at the National Level,
22.
ICTJ (Oct. 24, 2012}, https ://www.ictj.org/news/courts-first-resort-prosecuting-intemational-crimesnati
onal-level (reporting on the Greentree Conference on Complementarity, at which conference
participants assessed national prosecutions for the purposes of ICC complementarity with respect to
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC}, Guatemala, and Ivory Coast.); see also
National Prosecutions of International Crimes, MAx-PLANCK-INSTITUT FDR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT, https://www.mpicc.de/en/forschung/forschungsarbeit/strafrecht/nation
ale_strafverfolgung.htrnl (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (reporting on conferences and reports issued for
various countries around the world and their capacity to prosecute international crimes, in the context of
ICC complementarity regime).
23.

Kreicker, supra note 20.

24.

Id.

25.
See generally Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in
National Courts, 90 IND. L.J. 829 (2015).
26.
Kreicker, supra note 20. This conclusion flows from the principle of territoriality of
jurisdiction: the idea that states have territorial jurisdiction over offenses committed on their territory.
27.
Mark Chadwick, Jusice in Syria:
Five Ways to Prosecute International Crime,
CONVERSATION (July 10, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/justice-in-syria-five-ways-toprose
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether the Syrian judiciary is truly independent
and neutral, and whether it would be able to lead a politically charged
investigation without interference from the Assad regime. 28
National courts of other states, however, could investigate and
possibly prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Syria. These types of
proceedings can occur either in situations where the prosecuting authority
has a nexus to the alleged crime (for example, ifthe perpetrator is a national
or resident of the prosecuting state), or in countries where universal
jurisdiction statutes exist and where the heinous and universal nature of the
alleged crime justifies prosecution by any state's courts.29 According to
recent reports, investigations into Syria are already occurring in France,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 30 In
Sweden, three individuals have been separately tried and convicted of
crimes committed in Syria's war after they left the country and traveled to
Sweden. 31 In addition, German authorities have successfully prosecuted
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities. 32 More investigations and cases of this
sort could take place in the future, and it is human rights defenders' hope
that the Mechanism will continue to assist with such prosecutions and
cases. 33 While prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities in national
courts under universal jurisdiction constitutes imperfect justice (because
such cases are often piecemeal, unlikely to satisfy all victims, result in trials
in absentia, and may result in dismissals), slow and imperfect justice may

cute-international-crime-75908 ("Prosecution of atrocities in the Syrian courts would present
considerable logistical and financial difficulties for a ruined state. Even if national trials were feasible
(if funded externally, for instance) they would risk being politically vulnerable to manipulation by the
ruling elite, whoever that may be.").
28.

Id.

29.
Justice for Syria, AMNESTY INT'L, https://www.arnnesty.org/en/latest/carnpaigns/2017/03/
justice-for-syria/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L].
30.
Q&A: First Cracks to Impunity in Syria, Iraq, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:01
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/20/qa-first-cracks-impunity-syria-iraq [hereinafter HUM. RTS.
WATCH: Q&A]; see also Chadwick, supra note 27 (reporting that in Sweden, Finland, Germany and
Switzerland refugees present in those countries and suspected of international crimes are being
prosecuted under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction).
31.
Vera Padberg, Prosecutions ofSyrian War Crimes, !LAWYER BLOG (Feb. 18, 2017), http://
ilawyerblog.com/prosecutions-of-syrian-war-crimes/.
Syria: First Atrocities Trials Held in Europe, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:00
32.
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/03/syria-first-atrocities-trials-held-europe (reporting that
German courts have successfully prosecuted and convicted Syrian perpetrators, albeit on terrorism
charges, and that Swedish courts have also successfully prosecuted and convicted perpetrators of Syrian
atrocities).

33.

See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29.
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be beneficial to no justice at all. 34 According to war crimes prosecutor
Stephen Rapp, ''the slow-moving wheels of justice eventually caught up
with Chile's Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic of the former
Yugoslavia."35 As of today, it appears that the Mechanism will cooperate
with national jurisdictions and will share some of its investigative work
with national prosecutors and that national prosecutions may represent the
only near-future model of accountability for Syria.
Because national prosecutions often suffer from "defects," such as
inexperienced judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, inadequate
criminal laws and jurisdictional statutes, and insufficient resources, some
countries have created specialized war crimes chambers within their
existing judiciaries to investigate and prosecute cases involving
international crimes and atrocities. 36 Such war crimes chambers already
exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 37 The advantage of specialized war
crimes chambers is that they may receive assistance from the international
community through programs to train judges, prosecutors, and defense
counsel, assistance with the possible re-drafting of national penal laws as
well as with communications and outreach strategies, and other financial
resources. Some domestic war chambers may become "internationalized"
in light of significant involvement and assistance by the international
community. 38
Examples of internationalized domestic war crimes
chambers include the Iraqi Special Tribunal, as well as the new Kosovo
Specialist Chambers. 39

34.

See HUM. RTS. WATCH: Q&A, supra note 30.

35.
James Rein!, Could Syria's 'Prosecutor Without A Tribunal' Work?, AIJAZEERA (May
31, 2017), http://www.aljazeeracom/indepth/features/2017/05/syria-prosecutor-tribunal-work-l 705291 l
0910869.html.
36.

Sterio, supra note 18, at 244.

37.
Id at 245 (noting that the Bosnian War Chamber "is a specialized domestic chamber that
handles various war crimes cases, either handed down by the ICTY as part of its completion strategy, or
investigated on its own," that the Chamber applies local law and is located in the capital city of
Sarajevo, and that the Chamber "employs a mix of international staff, as well as local Bosnian Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims").
38.

Id.

39.
Id.; see Kosovo SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR'S OFF.,
https://www.scp-ks.org/en (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Kosovo] ("Kosovo Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office are part of the judicial system of Kosovo. The Chambers
are attached to each level of the Kosovo court system .... They are of temporary nature with a specific
mandate and jurisdiction, namely over certain crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes
under Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between I January 1998 and 31 December 2000 .... The
Specialist Chambers have a seat in The Hague, the Netherlands, and are to be staffed with international
judges, prosecutors and staff.").
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Under the current Syrian leadership of President Assad, it is unrealistic
to expect the creation of a specialized war chamber. The same deficiencies
which would plague a national prosecution in Syria would similarly affect a
specialized tribunal or chamber. Because of resources necessary to create a
specialized war crimes chamber, it is also unrealistic to expect that a
foreign jurisdiction would create a specialized chamber within its own
judicial system solely for the benefit of prosecuting Syrian atrocities. The
existing and past war crimes chambers and tribunals, in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Iraq have all been created toward the purpose of prosecuting
individuals responsible for atrocities committed in those same countries. 40
A specialized war crimes chamber, or a national prosecution, in Syria could
however exist if a new regime were to be put in place or elected. If
President Assad were to step down, a new leadership committed to
transitional justice may be interested and able to prosecute perpetrators
either in Syrian national courts or in a specialized war crimes chamber. As
of today, this is a remote possibility.
A third model of accountability which has been utilized by some
countries over the past two decades is the creation of a hybrid tribunal.
Hybrid tribunals are typically established through an agreement between
the host nation, affected by a conflict and resolving transitional justice
issues, and the international community, typically the United Nations. 41
Recent examples of hybrid tribunals include the Special Court for Sierra
Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 42 Hybrid tribunals typically
apply a mixture of domestic and international law and are typically
composed of judicial chambers consisting of domestic and international
judges.43 They may be located in the host country and thus may have a
stronger territorial nexus to the conflict which they are trying to address. 44
In theory, one could envision the creation of a hybrid tribunal for Syria
in the future. Academics have already proposed the creation of such a
tribunal. 45 In the United States, a group of senators recently introduced a

40.

See Kosovo, supra note 39; Sterio, supra note 18.

41.

Sterio, supra note 18, at 240--41.

42.

Id

43.

Id at 241.

44.
See, e.g., Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice,
41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1013, 1023-25 (2009).
45.
See Blue Ribbon Panel ofExperts lo Urrveil Draft Statute for Syrian Tribunal on October
3, 8:30-9:30 AM, At the National Press Club in Washington D.C., PILPG (Sept. 25, 2013), https://
www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/blue-ribbon-panel--0f-experts-to-unveil-draftstatuteforsy
rian-tribunal--0n--0etober-3-830-930-arn-at-the-national-press-club-in-washington-d-c/ (reporting that a
panel of former international tribunal chief prosecutors, international judges, and leading experts has
prepared a Draft Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes).

.,
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bipartisan bill-Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act-aimed at
investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Syria
and at imposing accountability on Syrian President Assad. 46 In this bill, the
senators called on the United States Secretary of State to assist in creating a
hybrid tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for most
heinous abuses in Syria, as part of "credible transitional justice efforts."47
Nonetheless, the hybrid tribunal option remains difficult to implement
while President Assad is in power. The establishment of a hybrid tribunal
presupposes the host country's agreement, and as mentioned above, it is
unlikely that the Assad regime would agree to an investigation and
prosecutions by a hybrid tribunal which would implicate itself. 48 If Syrian
leadership changed and a new regime accepted to work with the
international community to establish a hybrid tribunal, this option may be
attractive for a conflict such as the one in Syria. One of the main
advantages of hybrid tribunals is their ability to tailor their statutes to the
particular conflict they are seeking to address, by incorporating both
domestic and international law offenses. A hybrid tribunal for Syria could
prosecute perpetrators for international crimes, but could also incorporate
Syrian penal law offenses, if necessary. Another advantage of such
tribunals is their proximity to the conflict, if they are located in the host
country. This is helpful because in terms of outreach to the Syrian people,
reconciliation, and national healing, a hybrid tribunal located in Syria
would be able to more easily investigate and collect evidence and would
likely perform better.49 As of today, because the probability of regime
change in Syria remains low for the near future, a hybrid tribunal remains a
theoretical but unlikely option.
A fourth model of accountability involves the creation of an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal. The United Nations Security Council,
through its Chapter VII powers, created two such tribunals in the 1990s, for
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. 50 These tribunals were created
against the wishes of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and were located
outside of these two countries, at The Hague and in Arusha, Tanzania,
46.
US Senators Cal/for 'Hybrid Tribunal' for Syrian War Crimes, RT (Apr. 8, 2017, 11:16),
https://www.rt.com/usa/384024-hybrid-tribunal-syria-bill/.
47.

Id

48.
Chadwick, supra note 27 ("If the Bashar al-Assad regime is to remain in power in Syria
this may create significant difficulties for this approach. Its success would depend on the government's
willingness to cooperate and submit itself to investigation alongside opposition groups.").
49.

See Sterio, supra note 18, at 240.

50.
Marieke L. Wierda, What lessons Can Be Learned from the Ad Hoc Tribunals?, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 13, 13-14 (2002) (noting the establishing of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)).
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respectively. 51 International ad hoc tribunals are composed of international
judges and apply international criminal law; they typically do not
incorporate any of the features of domestic criminal systems and do not
employ local judges. 52 Although such tribunals do not necessitate the
relevant country's approval, they do require a Security Council resolution
because they involve a process which breaches the affected country's
sovereignty. In the Syrian context, Russia and China have already vetoed
resolutions which would have authorized the referral of the Syrian situation
to the ICC, and it is highly likely that Russia and China would also veto a
resolution seeking to establish the creation of a new ad hoc tribunal for
Syria. 53 Thus, this option remains of limited utility today. If the geo
political situation were to change drastically and if Russia and China ceased
to support Assad, or if Assad were to step down and a new regime, less pro
Russian and pro-Chinese, were put in power in Syria, then an international
ad hoc tribunal could be possible. In the short term, this is unlikely to · .
occur.
Last, the ICC is another model of accountability, where perpetrators of
atrocities, such as those committed in Syria, can be prosecuted. The ICC
has jurisdiction over three main categories of crimes: genocide; crimes
against humanity; and war crimes. 54 In order for a case to come within the
ICC's jurisdiction, the alleged crime or crimes must have been committed
on the territory of a member state, or the perpetrator must be a national of a
member state. 55 Additionally, cases may be referred to the ICC by the
Security Council. 56 Syria is not a member of the ICC. 57 Assuming war
crimes and crimes against humanity took place in Syria, the ICC would
have jurisdiction only over cases involving so-called "foreign fighters"
individuals who are nationals of an ICC member state and who chose to
fight in the Syrian conflict. 58 The court would not have jurisdiction over
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cases involving Syrian nationals, because the alleged crimes occurred in
Syria, on the territory of a non-member state, and the Syrian perpetrators
are not nationals of a member state. 59 As mentioned above, the United
Nations Security Council can refer any case to the ICC; in the case of Syria,
however, Russia and China have already exercised their respective veto
powers over a proposed resolution referring the Syrian situation to the
ICC. 60 Thus, the ICC is of limited utility in the Syrian context, as it can
only assume jurisdiction over cases involving foreign fighters who are
nationals ofICC member states.
This relative lack of accountability mechanisms for Syria-as detailed
above, in the current situation, where the only viable accountability model
is national prosecutions of perpetrators in the courts of third countries
which are willing and able to take such remote cases-has led the General
Assembly to envision a more creative solution. Thus, in December 2016,
the General Assembly passed a resolution creating a Mechanism for Syria. 61
The section below will discuss the Mechanism's main features and will
assess whether the Mechanism can lead toward accountability in Syria.
IV.

IIIM

As mentioned above, the United Nations General Assembly created a
Mechanism for Syria in December 2016. 62 The Mechanism is not a
tribunal, and its purpose instead is to collect and preserve evidence, which
will later be shared with relevant international and national tribunals that
may in the future prosecute those responsible for crimes committed in
Syria. 63 The Mechanism's mandate is to focus on the most serious crimes:
genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes. 64 The Mechanism will
be located in Geneva, and it will be staffed with an international judge or
prosecutor and renown experts in international criminal law. 65 The
Mechanism's primary purpose will be to collect and organize evidence
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(both inculpatory and exculpatory), which will in the future be shared with
competent tribunals and which will contribute toward future prosecutions of
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities. 66 The Mechanism, however, will not share
information with jurisdictions and authorities which impose the death
penalty, and/or which do not abide by basic international human rights
standards, such as the right to a fair trial. 67 According to one set of
commentators, "[t]he Mechanism is an important addition to the
international justice landscape" which may "provide a bridge between the
contemporaneous collection of evidence and its use in trials that may take
place years or even decades later."68 Overall, the Mechanism's ultimate
goal "is to ensure justice for the victims of these crimes and for all the
Syrian people affected by the violence."69
For now, according to Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human
Rights Watch, the Mechanism is a "prosecutor without a tribunal," and it
remains to be seen how the evidence it collects may be used in the future,
and whether the Mechanism will ultimately contribute toward the
protection of human rights. 70 Because of Russian and Chinese veto,
Security Council has been deadlocked and it is unlikely that the Syrian
situation will be referred to the ICC in the near future, or that an ad hoc
tribunal will be established for Syria. 71 Thus, it appears more likely that the
Mechanism will share evidence and information with national jurisdictions,
prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities under a universal jurisdiction
model.
In sum, it may be argued that the Mechanism is the first step necessary
toward protecting human rights in Syria, by collecting evidence necessary
toward successful future prosecutions and by initiating the accountability
conversation regarding Syria within the international community. As
mentioned above, in light of the Russian and Chinese veto, it is unlikely
that the Security Council will refer the Syrian situation to the ICC in the
near future. 72 It is more likely that the Syrian situation will be investigated
within national jurisdictions. If President Assad were to step down and if a
new regime were to be elected or otherwise installed in Syria, a new hybrid
tribunal could be established for Syria. Such a hybrid tribunal in Syria
66.
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could build upon the legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and it could contribute further toward the
protection of human rights in the international community. The Mechanism
is likely to work with both national jurisdictions as well as with any Syria
hybrid tribunal in the future; it is, therefore, the first important step toward
accountability for Syria.
V.

CONCLUSION

With respect to Syria, it may be that the war ends in regime transition
and that members of the Assad leadership face accountability, either in the
ICC (assuming no Russian or Chinese veto), or in an ad hoc tribunal, set up
by the Security Council or negotiated by the new Syrian leadership and the
international community. If Assad were to step down from power, a new
Syrian government could also choose to initiate national prosecutions, or to
establish a specialized war crimes chamber to try those responsible for the
most serious atrocities during the Syrian civil war. Because many
accountability options remain open in the future, the ongoing quest for
peace in Syria should not sacrifice accountability. Peace negotiators should
focus instead on ending violence without promising blanket immunity to
those involved in the conflict, thereby leaving open the option of near
future accountability, through domestic or international prosecutions.
Peace and justice can be sequenced properly in Syria, as both of these goals
are fundamental to the achievement of global peace and stability.

